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At the outbreak of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) called for 75,000 
volunteers to suppress the Confederacy. The secession of eleven southern states and the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter officially began the Civil War. Because of the United States’ 
reliance on an expandable army during wartime, Lincoln was mandated to release a proclamation 
calling for volunteers. Most men who called southern states home had withdrawn from the Union 
to fight against it, and while each Confederate soldier had different motives for their enlistment, 
their withdrawal meant that the Union lacked men to fight for their army. Prior to the Civil War, 
standing armies were small and limited, mainly stationed out on frontiers to secure the lands 
from the Indians. The issue of whether the country needed a powerful or a minimal standing 
army had been controversial since the founding of America, and had been regularly debated 
between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. To suffice the need for soldiers to fight in the Civil 
War, Lincoln found it essential to call for volunteers; he had needed 75,000 men but received 
twice that number. With volunteers numbering up to the hundred-thousands, the Union Army 
primarily consisted of citizen-soldiers who had little or no military experience. Neither 
professionally trained nor permanent at soldiering, these citizen-soldiers would face challenges 
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throughout the war that could jeopardize a Union victory. Lincoln’s volunteers enhanced the 
Union’s chance of victory, but they did not guarantee it, especially with Lincoln’s problems with 
his generals. With both these challenges and advantages for the Union, secession of eleven states 
would result in the American Civil War and necessitate Lincoln’s call for a militia of 75,000 
men, though it did not guarantee a Union victory. 
Fourteen days before Lincoln called for a militia, the country suffered through the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter. Lincoln was determined to preserve the Union and refused to 
abandon the Fort. He wrote in his message to William H. Seward (1801-1872), “I immediately 
gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the 
forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception, that it does 
not propose to abandon Fort Sumpter.”1 Lincoln’s plan fell short. On April 13, 1861, the 
President was forced to surrender the fort to the Confederates. A second wave of secession 
followed as Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee left the Union, resulting in 
eleven states forming the new Confederate States of America. The addition of the four newly 
seceded states meant that more men would eventually withdraw from the Union. Initially Lincoln 
did not acknowledge the Confederate States of America as its own country, sternly proclaiming 
to a Committee from the Virginia Convention that “military posts and property situated within 
the states, which claim to have seceded, as yet belonging to the Government of the United States, 
as much as they did before the supposed secession.”2 From the start, Lincoln had wanted to 
avoid a Civil War, but the secession of eleven states indicated that a Civil War was inevitable so 
long as the Union was to be preserved. Though the United States had a larger standing army in 
 
1 Roy P. Bassler et al., eds., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1953), 316. 
2 Ibid., 330. 
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comparison to the time of President Thomas Jefferson (1723-1826), secession severely impacted 
the number of soldiers the country had, which is why a call for volunteers became necessary. 
The United States had traditionally been opposed to having a powerful standing army, 
and most of its troops were stationed on the frontiers. The concept of a standing army can be 
linked back to the time of George Washington (1732-1799) and Alexander Hamilton (1755-
1804), who had “established in their lifetimes the basic parameters for American military 
policy...the primacy of civilian control, a dual military system...a well-articulated system of 
military education, and an office-heavy regular army designed to expand quickly in wartime.”3 
The ratification of the Constitution also allowed the nation to raise armies, according to Article I 
Sec. 8, where the Articles of Confederation previously banned it. Lincoln’s call for volunteers 
was based on Hamilton’s notion of an expandable army composed of citizen-soldiers who, 
during wartime, would fight alongside a small group of professionals, by “simply adding enlisted 
men to existing companies.”4 The concept of the expandable army continued to be prevalent at 
the time of the Civil War and was maintained during the conflict. The expandable army also 
proved that “The wave of volunteerism did in a sense vindicate the popular belief that a 
substantial standing army was unnecessary, because large numbers of citizen-soldiers had 
actually rallied to the colors in a time of crisis.”5 The large number of volunteers was evidence 
that the idea of an expandable army best served the interests of the country. 
Because slavery was the central issue of the war, the motives of most Confederate 
soldiers inevitably tied back to it, and each one had personal views on slavery. Lieutenant 
William Cowper Nelson of Mississippi wrote, “I have thought that this war was ordered by 
 
3 Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 12-13. 
4 Ibid., 16. 
5 Ibid., 118. 
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Providence, as a means of settling definitely and conclusively the question of slavery.”6 Many 
but not all had returned to their states to fight for the preservation of slavery. Nelson relied on 
God to answer the question of slavery, willing to be open to the destruction of slavery as well as 
its preservation. South Carolinian Samuel Elias Mays wrote, “What are we fighting for? Why 
should I take up arms against the Union?”7 Many Confederate soldiers found themselves in the 
same situation, not necessarily fighting to preserve slavery, but instead fighting for the liberty to 
keep their way of life. As the war continued on, the Confederates’ motive became more unified; 
“By 1861, Confederate soldiers saw that their greatest abolitionist was not Harriet Beecher 
Stowe or John Brown, but Abraham Lincoln himself.”8 Lincoln’s election would be a defining 
point of the Civil War, as the Antebellum South realized the likelihood of abolition from this 
new president. Even though there were numerous non-slaveholding Confederate soldiers, many 
of them fought for slavery, as “to varying degrees, the independence of the individual, personal 
honor, the values and traditions of their community, private sacrifice for the public good, 
obedience to a Christian hierarchy, and preservation of the institution of slavery”9 motivated 
these soldiers. On the condition that the issue of slavery was to be resolved, men who considered 
the Confederate states home went back to their states to fight the war, and Lincoln sought 
volunteers by issuing a draft.  
While the Union’s determination to abolish slavery was also obvious, the personal 
motives of the Union soldiers sometimes overlapped with the Confederates. The Union army 
fought for the abolition of slavery in essence, but “at the heart of that disagreement...Individual 
 
6 Colin Edward Woodward, “‘The Question of Slavery’ Confederate Soldiers and the Sothern Cause, 1861-1862,” in 
Marching Masters: Slavery, Race, and the Confederate Army during the Civil War (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2014), 21. 
7 Woodward, “Question of Slavery,” 12. 
8 Ibid., 23-24. 
9 Andrew S. Bledsoe, Citizen Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American 
Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2015), 4. 
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liberty, freedom, and self-government, according to republican tradition, provided a common 
identity and shared history that all Americans could, and did claim.”10 A common theme that 
played out is the yearning for individual liberty and self-government, with the North wanting to 
abolish slavery, and the South wanting to preserve it. Written in his diary on August 25, 1862, 
Rufus Kingsley of the 8th Vermont Regiment said, “Thank God I enlisted when I did, and where 
I did! Thank God for the opportunity of preaching Abolitionism to slaveholders, and to slaves: of 
making men dissatisfied with the condition they are in; because, until dissatisfied with their 
present state, they can never be led to a better.”11 Just like Southeners, Union soldiers had 
differing views on slavery; however, as the war progressed the Union soldiers tended to have a 
more unified view regarding the issue. One soldier from the Midwest said, “You have no idea of 
the changes that have taken place in the minds of the soldiers in the last two months...to face the 
sum of all evils, and cause of the war...men of all parties seem unanimous in the belief that to 
permanently establish the Union, [we must]...first wipe [out] the institution of slavery.”12 Over 
the course of war, these Union soldiers embraced emancipation as their perception of slavery 
transformed, not only believing that slavery was the cause of the war, but the destruction of 
slavery would also be the only way to end the war.  
These performances of the volunteers often endangered a Union victory but the blame 
cannot be put on them as many had never been professionally trained. The defeat at the First 
Battle of Bull Run had been a terrible blow for the Union. Brevet Brigadier General Francis S. 
Fiske of the Second New Hampshire Regiment remembered the many mistakes the Union army 
 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 David C. Rankin, Diary of a Christian Soldier: Rufus Kinsley and the Civil War. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 104. 
12 Chandra Manning, “A ‘Vexed Question’ White Union Soldiers on Slavery and Race.” in The View from the 
Ground: Experiences of Civil War Soldiers. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 34. 
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had made. “The day was one of mistakes and blunders on the Union side from the very 
beginning,” Fiske wrote. “The tardiness of [Brigadier General Daniel] Tyler’s division in the 
early morning...caused the long delay of [Colonel David] Hunter’s division...and gave the Rebels 
time to prepare to meet the attack on their left flank. The misdirection of Henitzelman’s division, 
the delay in placing [Colonel Andrew] Porter’s brigade, left Burnside’s brigade to bear the brunt 
of the first hour’s fighting alone. The advance of the batteries of [Captain Charles] Griffin and 
[J.B.] Ricketts, before assurance of adequate support, was a fatal mistake, and last of all the 
failure to bring up the reserves and hold them at Stone Bridge left the retreating columns to face 
about and protect their rear as best they could.”13 Many of these mistakes caused significant 
casualties. The Union army outnumbered the Confederates by thousands, and the Union enjoyed 
a much more extensive supply than the Confederates. This seemed to guarantee a victory for the 
North, but the First Battle of Bull Run demonstrated that the Union merely had an advantage, not 
a guaranteed victory. Lieutenant Eugene Carter expressed his views of the battle, “You will hear 
great stories about the bravery of this and that regiment of volunteers...but believe me, most of 
them acted like cowards in my division.”14 The price of having an expandable army was this: the 
lack of experience of citizen-soldiers was a major problem for the North, but blame for the 
Union’s failure cannot be laid specifically on these volunteers. 
Lincoln’s difficulty in finding a good general also complicated the Union effort. Aside 
from the challenges that came from these citizen-soldiers, some West Pointers also proved to be 
terrible generals. Lincoln’s relationship with George B. McClellan (1826-1885) quickly 
deteriorated, though he was impressive in many ways. McClellan’s reluctance to take command 
 
13 Francis S. Fiske, “At the Battle of Bull Run with the Second New Hampshire Regiment,” in Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil War, ed. Peter Cozzens (University of Illinois Press, 2004), 60-61. 
14 Bledsoe, Citizen Officers, 138. 
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irritated President Lincoln as the Union lost opportunities for a victory. McClellan continuously 
overestimated the Confederates, and during the Peninsula campaign, this failure to take 
Richmond infuriated the President. Lincoln voiced his desperation and frustration to McClellan 
in his letters. “And, once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I 
am powerless to help this,”15 McClellan’s reluctance to pursue his advantages clearly 
jeopardized the Northern victory. Lincoln continued in his letter to McClellan that “The country 
will not fail to note–is now noting–that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, 
is but the story of Manassas repeated.”16 Lincoln’s difficulty to find a general became one of his 
toughest challenges throughout the war. Once he removed McClellan, he had to rely on generals 
like Robert Sheridan and Ambrose Burnside before finding Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), whose 
leadership led to the Union victory.  
The Union army seemed to evolve once Grant was put in command. A year prior to 
Grant’s promotion as a Major General, Lincoln congratulated him on his excellent achievement. 
“I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful 
acknowledgement for the almost inestimable service you have done the country,”17 Lincoln 
wrote to Grant. On March 10, 1864, Lincoln announced “Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant, 
U.S. Army, is assigned to the command of the armies of the United States.”18 The Union 
achieved victory in 1865 after Grant took command of the Union Army. Though the South had 
General Robert E. Lee (1807-1870) for most of the war, leadership problems were a common 
occurrence in the Confederate Army. The death of Stonewall Jackson (1824-1863) and Major 
 
15 Bassler et al., CW, 185. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 326. 
18 Ibid., 236. 
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General Braxton Bragg’s (1817-1876) unpopular leadership style compromised the Confederate 
effort.  
The enthusiasm of volunteers to fight for liberty and freedom played a major role for the 
Union army in the Civil War. Lincoln’s call for volunteers proved to be necessary, as he needed 
the army to expand rapidly after the secession. Yet, the misconception that the Union would have 
won the Civil War regardless, due to their advantages of men and finances, had continued to 
prevail. The challenges that the Union faced, demonstrated that the Union victory did not come 
easily; they might have lost as easily as the South might have won. Many thought that the war 
would end with a quick Union victory, but the Northern defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run 
demonstrated the fallacy of that theory and showed that a southern victory was possible. The 
Union’s eventual victory was not merely a consequence of superior industrial and financial 
advantages, but more a result of its commitment to end slavery, to preserve the Union, strategic 
planning, and the arrival of the competent General Ulysses S. Grant, with whom Lincoln could 
work. 
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